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Theft, Property Rights and the Human Body –
A Scottish Perspective
Jonathan Brown
Glasgow School for Business and Society, Department of Law, Economics, Account-
ancy and Risk, Glasgow Caledonian University.
Abstract
The notion of proprietal rights in human biological material is one
which, until recently with the case of Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2010]
QB 1, the English courts have heavily resisted. Consequently it has been assumed by
many legal commentators, and even some judges, that Scots law is also hostile to the
notion.
This article analyses the historical context of Scots law and avers that the law of
Scotland is, in fact, quite different from that of England in this regard. The submission
is substantiated by reference to historic legal cases, contemporary sociological and
technological developments in Scotland and the inapplicability of the English legal
tenets which prevent recognition of proprietal rights in the human body to this juris-
diction.
Having argued in favour of the existence of proprietal rights in human biological
material in Scotland, the article then asks, and answers, the question ‘in whom is the
ownership right vested?’.
In order to answer this question, and throughout the course of the article, relevant
literature and case law are reviewed comprehensively. The benefits which may be en-
joyed as a result of the recognition of such rights of property are also argued and de-
bated and consequently the article concludes with a full summary of all relevant ar-
guments and points of discussion.
Introduction
The law precluding the ownership of human biological mate-
rial is thought to be as firmly settled in Scotland as it is in England. The recent
decision by Lord Brodie in C v. Advocate General for Scotland1 saw his lordship
state, in passing, that there can be no rights of ownership in a human corpse.2
The plain and simple nature of this statement illustrates that, although it appears
that the existence of a rule precluding ownership of a human corpse or biolo-
gicalmaterial has never been challenged or argued against in the Scottish courts,
C v. Advocate General for Scotland (2012) S.L.T 103.1
Ibid., para. 63.2
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the judiciary presently appears to assume that the legal maxim ‘Dominus
membrorum suorum nemo videtur’ (‘no one is to be regarded as the owner of
his own limbs’)3 applies in Scotland.
In the recent House of Lords case of R v. Bentham,4 Lord Rodger cited this
maxim through the course of his judgment,5 illustrating that it firmly forms a
part of English law.
Although it may be assumed, prima facie, that the law of Scotland follows
a similar vein to that of England on thismatter, and that there can be no property
in a whole corpse or living person, this area of law nevertheless merits examin-
ation, particularly given the fact that the case of Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS
Trust6 suggests that the law of England is looking to reanalyse this position with
a view to permitting recognition of proprietal rights.7
This article assesses the applicability of the English legal reasons which
preclude the ownership of a corpse to the general principles, history and devel-
opment of the law of Scotland in this area. It examines the relevance of the
tenets of English law in light of recent advances in medical technology and
radical changes concerning sociological and spiritual thought. Further, the case
of the case of Dewar v. HMA,8 in which Lord Moncrieff stated, obiter, that a
corpse could be stolen at any point prior to interment, is considered.9 The 1733
case ofM’Kenzie,10 along with the commentary on the subject of crimes by the
institutional writer Burnett,11 also suggest that in Scotland, unlike in England,
a corpse can be the subject of theft.
The twomain questions which this position raises – namely, how can a dead
body be stolen if it is not property for the purposes of law and, if it can be stolen,
fromwhom is the enjoyment of property deprived – are addressed in the course
of this article. The relevance of the silence of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act
200612 on the issue of proprietal rights in human biological material is critically
examined and the present Scottish common law position inferred from legal
analysis.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVIII, Dig. 9.2.13 18 Ad Ed.3
R. v. Bentham [2005] UKHL18.4
Ibid., para. 14.5
Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] Q.B. 1.6
Ibid., para. 45(a).7
Dewar v. HMA (1945) J.C. 5.8
Ibid., 14.9
M’Kenzie (1733), heard before Lord Milton and reported in J. Burnett, A Treatise on the Various
Branches of the Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: George Ramsey and Company, 1811), 124.
10
Burnett, A Treatise (note 10), 124.11
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 asp 4, www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2006/4/pdfs/asp_
20060004_en.pdf.
12
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The Need for a Reanalysis
In the case of Yearworth, it was stated that scientific develop-
ments in the United Kingdom are such that the present common law position
is inadequate and requires reanalysis.13 The developments which related spe-
cifically to Yearworth concerned the storage of frozen sperm samples. It is clear
from this that their lordships would have had matters such in vitro fertilisation
(IVF) treatment firmly in mind when passing their judgment, and it is not too
much of a stretch to suggest that their commentsmay also refer tomatters such
as organ donation. It is quite obvious that these named developments of science,
which led the Court of Appeal to state that such a need for re-evaluation exists
in England, also affect Scotland.14
On a matter such as this, which raises a variety of ethical questions, it is
evident that the jurisprudence of one nation in the western world may be influ-
enced by legal reasoning in another similar jurisdiction, or at least in one where
moral thinking and history may be regarded as closely linked. Indeed, on this
matter specifically, one can see quite clearly that the law of England was heavily
influenced by the Australian High Court decision of Doodeward v. Spence,15 as
the cases of R v. Kelly16 and Yearworth refer to this judgment with approval. The
English Human Tissue Act 200417 utilises the words of Chief Justice Griffith
from that case,18 stating the now accepted view that one may have a right to
possess human biological material only if ‘human work or skill’ are applied to
it, and said body part resultantly acquires different attributes.19
A reanalysis of English law in this regardmay be difficult, since Lord Justice
Rose stated in R v. Kelly that, although the common law does not stand still:
‘[I]f that principle is now to be changed, in our view, it must be by Parliament,
because it has been express or implicit in all the subsequent authorities and
writings to which we have been referred that a corpse or part of it cannot be
stolen.20’
Ibid., para. 45(a).13
IVF treatment is available on the NHS in both Scotland and England;
www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/889.aspx?CategoryID=68&SubCategoryID=154.
14
Doodeward v. Spence (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406.15
R. v. Kelly [1999] Q.B. 621.16
Human Tissue Act 2004 ch. 30, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/30.17
Ibid., s. 32(9)(c).18
The logic of confining this right of possession solely to instances where human work or skill
have been applied was stated to be illogical in Yearworth (note 6), para. 45(d); from this it is
clear that English law is moving towards proprietor rights coming into existence.
19
R v. Kelly (note 16), 630.20
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But what of the Scots law position? Theft of corporeal property in Scotland
is an entirely common law crime, while the crime of theft in England is almost
entirely codified by statute.21 Although there can be no doubt that precedent
from England may be regarded as persuasive or influential in a Scottish court
where controversial issues are concerned, and vice versa, this procedural differ-
ence may lead to doubt as to the actual applicability of authority of one jurisdic-
tion in the other, as established by the fact that Dewar v. HMA was given no
consideration inKelly, in spite of the relevance which the former judgmentmay
have had on the decision of the latter case. If the authority ofDewarwas anything
other than specifically Scottish, there is little doubt that counsel would have
utilised it in its submissions. As a result, an important difference between Scots
and English law is revealed.
It may be inferred from this difference that there is no need for parliamen-
tary intervention in Scotland, as direct precedent from the Inner House on a
matter should be regarded as being farmore persuasive in court than amultitude
of English cases, even if the Scots authority is merely obiter. This is particularly
true where an inter-jurisdictional interpretation of authority is not made north
and south of the border. In addition, the Scottish Parliament had the opportunity,
during the passing of the 2006 Act, to clarify the law in this regard by expressly
affirming the allegedly extant ‘no property in a corpse’ rule, yet it neglected to
do so. In failing to prohibit the existence of proprietal rights in human biological
material, Parliament may have left scope for the ever-evolving common law of
Scotland to look back on its distinct traditions and advance in a manner which
takes into account the nature of life in the twenty-first century.22 Such scope is
available since the ‘no property’ rule is not at all definite in Scotland, as will be
shown, and indeed, Scots lawmay diverge radically from English on thismatter.
That is not to say that there are no hurdles in the way of such progress being
made. Indeed, it appears that the prevailing attitude of the Scottish judiciary is
an assumption that no proprietal rights may be vested in a corpse, given the
judgment of Lord Brodie in C.
It would appear that the 1898 sheriff court case of Robson v. Robson23 had
some impact on his lordship’s judgment,24 as the sheriff in that case was of the
opinion that the law of Scotland was as settled as the law of England.25However,
the sheriff did briefly considerM’Kenzie, reported in Burnett’s treatise,26which
In the Theft Act 1968 ch. 60.21
Techniques relating to the storage of the organs of a deceased donor are but one example of
the differences between life in the twenty-first century and any other time period; see
22
S. Mukherjee, ‘OrganPreservation’(Medscapte Reference 2011), http://emedicine.med-
scape.com/article/431140-overview.
Robson v. Robson (1898) S.L.T 445 351.23
C v Advocate General (note 1), para. 52.24
Robson (note 23), 352.25
Burnett, A Treatise (note 10), 124.26
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he regarded as a discrepancy rather than sound law.27 According to Burnett, in
M’Kenzie a charge was brought after a corpse was stolen from a house.28 Al-
though the accused was acquitted, the charge was sustained as relevant. While
the case ofHMA v. Coutts29 states that the charge inM’Kenzie was one of ‘Ryot
and Violence’, the fact that Burnett discussed the case in his chapter on theft
must be regarded as relevant. In light of the comments inDewar it would appear
that the ‘better’ opinion prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century was not
the view held by Lord Moncrieff.30 Rather, it would seem that theft of a corpse
is indeed possible, if the theft is committed prior to internment, on the authority
ofM’Kenzie compounded with Dewar.
With the greatest respect to the judgment of Lord Brodie, the point of pos-
sible property in cadavers was not raised by counsel in C and the possible exist-
ence of such property rights in Scots law was not contended. Nor, in this case,
were the cases ofM’Kenzie or Dewar cited or considered. The sheriff in Robson
had considered the ‘no property in a corpse’ rule to be firmly settled in Scotland,
definitively stating that ‘there is no right of property in a dead body’,31 due to
his interpretation of theprevailing legal opinion of the time which suggested
that, in spite of precedent authority,32 a corpse could not be stolen. Without re-
gard for the opinion of the sheriff, Lord Moncrieff adopted the opposite view
47 years later – thus illustrating that there may be instances in which the law
appears to be quite clear, but is in fact ambiguous or unsettled.
It is also interesting to note that ‘infant’ children may be stolen according
to Scots law.33 While it is thought that a person cannot be stolen after the age
of puberty,34 the classification of a human being as ‘property’ in its formative
years cannot be disregarded. While some legal commentators regard this form
of theft as a special crime,35 it is nonetheless true that the recognition of the
possibility of a living person being stolen heavily implies the existence of pro-
Robson (note 23), 352: ‘[a] charge of theft of a corpse … was sustained; but the better opinion is
that this is wrong and that a corpse is extra commercium’.
27
M’Kenzie (note 10), heard before Lord Milton.28
HMA v. Coutts (1899) 3 Adam 50.29
In the words of the sheriff.30
Robson (note 23), 354.31
Burnett, A Treatise (note 10), 124.32
D. Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting the Description and Punishment of
Crimes (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1797-1800) 84.
33
J.H.A. MacDonald, A. Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th ed., eds J. Walker
& D.J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: W. Green Publications, 1948), 21; G. Gordon, The Criminal Law
34
of Scotland, Vol. II, 3rd ed., ed. M.G.A. Christie (Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons Ltd 2001),
para. 14.21.
T.H. Jones & M.G.A.Christie, Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons, 2008),
paras 10-15.
35
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prietal rights in respect of human biological material. In addition, there is case
law to suggest that plagium36 is simply a form of aggravated theft.37
Accordingly, it is averred that had the distinct nature of Scots law in this
regard been discussed, had the applicability of the English tenets which dictate
the existence of the ‘no property’ rule been challenged, and hadM’Kenzie been
given adequate considerationalongside the dictum of Lord Moncrieff, the
judgment on this point in the case of C would have been quite different. The
applicability of themaxims of English law to the Scottish jurisdiction is discussed
below.
The English Tenets and the Scottish Position
In Yearworth, the Court of Appeal further reaffirmed Ulpian’s
maxim,38 and restated the three tenets of English lawwhich preclude ownership
of human bodies and biological material.39
The first stated tenet precluding ownership of human biological material is
the maxim nominated by Ulpian and further extended by R v. Bentham; that is
to say, simply the principle that there is no right of ownership, or even posses-
sion, in a human body, living or dead. The Court in Yearworth cites two con-
sequences of this proposition, stating:
‘One consequence of the principle, albeit not recognised until the nineteenth
century, is that, if our bodies cannot be our own property, it follows that they
cannot be the property of other persons; and that therefore we cannot sell
ourselves, or be sold, to others. Another consequence is that, if we do not own
our bodies, we have no right to destroy them, ie to commit suicide’.40
The latter consequence necessitated legal reform in England in the form of
the Suicide Act 1961,41 which abrogated the law prohibiting suicide in England
and Wales.42 Prior to the passing of this Act, suicide and attempted suicide43
were criminal offences under English law44 which could see one forfeiting
proprietal rights in one’s estate and being sentenced to a ‘shameful’ burial.
As child stealing is referred to by the institutional writers.36
Rachel Wright (1809) mentioned in Gordon, Criminal Law (note 34), para. 14.26.37
Yearworth (note 6), para. 30.38
Ibid., paras 30-33.39
Ibid., para. 30.40
Suicide Act 1961 ch. 60, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/9-10/60.41
Ibid., s.1.42
See The King v. Mann [1914] 2 K.B. 107.43
One who committed such an act would be named felo de se (felon of oneself).44
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This brings us to the first difference between the law north and south of the
border, which is that suicide has not been a crime under Scottish law 45 since
an indeterminate time before the start of the nineteenth century.46Accordingly,
if the logic of the nominated consequences in Yearworth is reversed, it would
appear that a consequence of the right of destruction which is present in Scot-
land through no statutory intervention is that there must be some degree of
ownership in the human body, as one would have no such right if there was
not.
The prohibition on the sale of the human body, or derivative parts of it, is
now codified in statute in Scotland47 and England.48 These provisions raise a
vital question; if indeed there is no right of ownership or possession in a human
body, then exactly how can such material be sold? If no one in law can have any
right to the thing in question then title to it cannot logically be transferred by
one individual to another, as there is no recognisable real right to be passed by
the sale. The buyer would, in this instance, have asmuch – or as little, depending
on one’s point of view – right to the item prior to the sale as the seller at the
same point. The Romans referred to such an article as being res extra commer-
cium (a thing outside commerce). There was thus no need for legislation to
prohibit the sale of, for example, the city walls, as their sale was impossible as
a result of this doctrine.
However, the notion of the doctrine of res extra commercium as being a
maxim which precludes all ownership may be doubtedin Scotland for two
reasons. The first is Burnett’s comments:
‘By law of Scotland, everything that is moveable may be the subject of theft,
whether it is moveable property strictly so called, or made moveable by the act
and deed of the away taker... Everything may be the subject of theft that can be
carried off, and is not the property of the away-taker’.49
The second is that the Scottish Law Commission, in its 1976 report on cor-
poreal moveable property,50 took the view that while property which is regarded
as extra commercium cannot be sold, it can nevertheless be the subject of own-
ership, on the authority of the case of Presbytery of Edinburgh v. University of
See ‘Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide, Do the Moral Arguments Differ?’,
www.bma.org.uk/ethics/end_life_issues/Euthanasiaphysicianassistedsuicide.jsp?page
=4#.T3CrEDGXvTo, 22 September 2006.
45
D.M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland VI (Tottel Publishing: Butterworth, 2001), ch. 15,
‘Criminal Law’, 417.
46
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2005 (note 12) s. 20.47
Human Tissue Act 2004 (note 17) ch. 30, s. 32.48
Burnett, A Treatise (note 10) 124.49
Scottish Law Commission, Memorandum No. 30 Corporeal Moveables Usucaption or Acquis-
itive Prescription (31 August 1976).
50
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Edinburgh.51 In cases such as these, the owner of property extra commercium is
the State.
This is of particular interest as the learned sheriff in Robson had regarded
corpses as being extra commercium and was of the opinion that a consequence
of the human corpse holding this status was that it could not be the subject of
property. The above points provide further evidence that this is not the case.
As a result, Robson is not a sound authority which can be relied upon.
It has already been stated that the Scottish Act is silent on the question of
whether or not any part of the human body may be property for the purposes
of law, or legally possessed. However, this is open to argument. As it is absolutely
necessary for proprietal, or at least possession, rights to be vested in a thing in
order for a sale or supply of said thing to occur, the fact that Parliament saw fit
to introduce section 20 to this Act implies some degree of legislative recognition
of the potential existence of human biological material as property. That said,
it has been suggested52 that the prime reason the existence of property rights
in human material has been denied is to prevent the commodification of such
material, as it may be felt immoral or unethical to trade in human tissue.53 To
continue to deny such property rights on this ground is, however, fundamentally
flawed, given the explicit prohibition on commercial dealings.
Scope exists for a similar argument to be advanced in England, although
the likelihood of its success in that jurisdictionmay be doubted, as the comments
of Lord Justice Rose in R v. Kelly appear to suggest that the law is too firmly
settled south of the border for the legislative change to be made implicitly.
Although R v. Kelly may fall to be considered by a Scottish court, it would
not be at all legally binding on it and ergo it is open for the court to infer that
recognition of rights in biological material has been acknowledged legislatively
by implication.Dewar andM’Kenzie are specifically Scottish cases which recog-
nise the possibility of corpses being stolen and, as such, provide authority that
proprietal rights may be vested in a corpse. Combined with the fact that section
20 of the 2006 Act negates any argument that human biological material is to
be regarded as res extra commercium in Scotland, and the fact that the silence
of the act does nothing to prohibit the existence of proprietal rights in corpses,
it would appear that there is more authority to suggest that the law of Scotland
appears to recognise the possibility of ownership in dead bodies than not.
Presbytery of Edinburgh v. University of Edinburgh (1890) 28 S.L. Rep. 567, as per LordWellwood
573.
51
For a discussion on this topic, see A. George, ‘Property in the Human Body & Its Parts, Reflec-
tions on Self-Determination in Liberal Society’, Florence EUI Working Paper LAW 2001/8
52
(European University Institute, Florence, 2001), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/
1814/172/law01-08.pdf.
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Notwithstanding these points, it is evident that the lawmay prohibit the sale
or supply of items in which a right of property or possession may be vested
without prejudicing the existence of such rights. For example, the Misuse of
Drugs Act 197154 states that the supply of controlled substances is not lawful,55
but this does not at all detract from the fact that such substances are property
for the purposes of law and can be stolen, at least where the owner is in legal
possession thereof.56 This shows that while the lawmay prohibit the sale of the
human corpse or derivatives thereof, such prohibition does not automatically
render cadavers res extra commercium or incapable of being the subject of
ownership.
That the law imposes limitations on personal autonomy and in some in-
stances dictates what one may choose to do or refrain from doing with one’s
own body is not a convincing argument against the existence of proprietal rights,
due to the fact that no one could logically deny that a homeowner who legally
possesses land which is subject to a real burden or a servitude is not the rightful
and lawful owner of that property, simply because this ownership is subject to
conditions. Indeed, Bankton states that the law commonly places burdens on
all forms of property.57
The applicability and influence of the second nominated tenet in the twenty-
first centurymay be disputed on rathermore simple and contemporary grounds.
This reason was incorporated into English law as a result of allusions made by
Coke and Blackstone in their writings.58 The notion is, quite simply, that the
human body is the temple of the Holy Ghost and it would be sacrilege to do
anything with it other than to, in the words of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth,
‘bury it and let it remain buried’.59
Setting aside, for the moment, arguments as to the status of religion and
legal thought in relation to its place in twenty-first century society, the issue
with the applicability of this maxim may be quickly identified; cremation has
long been recognised as a legal and ethically acceptable method to dispose of
corpses in theUnited Kingdom, with several cases in the late nineteenth century
ruling the practice to be permissible,60 prior to explicit legislation being passed
in 1902 to ensure that the legality of cremation became unambiguous.61 Given
that it is quite trite to say that burning a body is not following the accord of
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 ch.38.54
Ibid., s.4(1)(b).55
There have been a number of reported instances of theft of controlled drugs; see R v. Adam
Mark Dyer [2007] EWCA Crim 90.
56
See Lord A.M. Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland (Stair Society, reprinted 1993), 505.57
Yearworth (note 6), para. 31.58
Ibid.59
SeeWilliams v. Williams (1882) 20 Ch. Div. 659; The Queen v. Price (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 247; In Re
Dixon (1892) P.D. 386-393, Robson (note 23).
60
Cremation Act 1902 ch.8.61
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traditional Christian principles,62 one may see quite clearly why this principle
is not applicable to Scotland at the time of writing.
Cremation was prohibited in the Catholic Church as a result of the 1917
Code of Canon Law (No. 1203). This prohibition was waived in 1963, though as
per the 1983 Code of Canon Law (No. 1173, 3) the Catholic Church continues
strongly to recommend burial. The Eastern Orthodox Church continues to en-
force a general prohibition on cremation as per the decision of the Council of
Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1932,63 which held that:
‘As a matter of principle, the incineration of the bodies of Orthodox Christi-
ans in crematoria is not permitted, in view of the fact that this custom has been
introduced by atheists and enemies of the Church. In all individual, extenuating
circumstances, the decision is left to the diocesan bishop’.64
Although there is no singular, unified Protestant Church and examination
of each individual theological school of thought is outside the scope of this arti-
cle, the general protestant position appears far more permissive than the
aforementioned sects, with the notion that ‘God can resurrect a bowl of ashes
just as conveniently as he can resurrect a bowl of dust’ being cited as a valid
interpretation of Christian accord.65 As a result of the differences between de-
nominations, however, contemporary protestant thought in relation towards
cremation cannot at present be discussed in any great detail.
Regardless of current thinking, cremation was seen by early Christians to
be a violation of theological thought in relation to the resurrection of Christ.
Consequently, burial was necessary for the resurrection of all Christian souls.
Certain biblical passages have been interpreted by many scholars as explicitly
decreeing that only burial follows the accord of Christian principles66 and as
such, in spite of the fact that there is certainly no overarching consensus, it may
be concluded that the permissibility of cremation is a deviation from conven-
tional Christian dogma. Therefore, the legality of the practice in the United
Kingdom suggests that the law cannot be founded on conventional Christian
principles and, accordingly, the second tenet cannot be held to apply to Scotland,
and indeed may no longer be regarded as applicable in England or Wales.
Although the abovemay possibly be regarded as adequate grounds to dismiss
the applicability of the second tenet in current law, its applicability may be fur-
ther disputed by following current twenty-first century jurisprudence and ob-






Notably Genesis 3:19 and Psalm 23:1.66
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serving the general decline in spirituality in both western society and Scotland,
combined with the fact that Scotland and England are multicultural societies
with a rich mosaic of differing faiths and philosophies. It is not at all logical to
suggest that the law should preclude the recognition of a right of ownership
over cadavers on this ground, either in Scotland or in England.
As it has now been shown why the first ground does not apply to Scotland
and the second should not apply to either Scotland or to England, we turn to
the third nominated tenet. This is simply that it would not serve the interests
of public health to allow disputes and arguments over the precise ownership
of a human corpse, as the corpse must be given a speedy burial67 in order to
prevent it rotting. While no doubt true, and indeed ostensibly applicable to
Scotland, this reason is offset by advances in technology, since it is possible to
preserve a corpse for a more or less indefinite period. Indeed, recent advances
in cryonic technology essentially allow for a legally dead but biologically living
human body to be preserved for an extended period of time without suffering
the effects of age, let alone decay.68 Although it may be conceded that this was
once a relevant and logical reason to preclude ownership of corpses, it quite
clearly does not apply in the twenty-first century, as public health would not be
compromised should a dispute occur over ownership of a corpse – the dead
body could simply be kept refrigerated in a morgue until the conclusion of the
case.
This issue, unlike the others listed, lies outside the scope of legal or ethical
reasoning as it is simply a consequence of advances in science. It has long been
evident that the law cannot prepare for new developments in technology quickly
enough, and that technology progresses at a far faster pace than most people’s
views of morality can accept or tolerate. However, refrigerator technology has
been commonplace for at least 90 years69 and has been extant in a number of
forms for several centuries;70 recognition of its utility in preventing corpse decay
is far from new. In this instance, the law must accept what has long been sci-
entific reality.
To conclude, it is clear that the latter two principlesmay have been applicable
to both Scotland and England at one time. However, this is certainly no longer
the case, as the influence of Christianity in the United Kingdom is no longer
as great as it used to be and the nation is now multicultural. Precluding rights
of ownership in dead bodies for reasons of public health is illogical and unne-
cessary, as technology now allows living and dead human biological material
The word ‘burial’ having been specifically used by Mr Justice Higgins in Doodeward v. Spence




Cooling technology was first demonstrated in 1748 at the University of Glasgow; see
www.mahalo.com/refrigerator/.
70
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to be stored for indefinite periods of time. The Court of Appeal in Yearworth
would consider these factors to be the advancement of civilisation.
The applicability of the first principle to Scotland is doubtful, given diver-
gences in the law between the two jurisdictions. There is authority to suggest
that human corpses can be stolen in Scotland, while no such authority exists
in England. It may also be suggested that the doctrine of res extra commercium
in Scotland does not apply in respect of the human body, given Burnett’s com-
mentary on the matter combined with the fact that the Scottish government
brought specific legislation into effect to preclude the sale of human biological
material. That said, even if the doctrine does apply with regard to the human
corpse, it does not actually serve to prevent proprietal rights existing. Finally,
the right of destruction which one has over one’s own body at common law in
Scotland implies that one must hold some degree of ownership in oneself,
given the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth.
This illustrates that the law of Scotland diverges quite radically from that of
England, as the distinct history, developments and traditions mentioned above
show that the first tenet precluding ownership of human biological material is
inapplicable in Scotland. Although the English Human Tissue Act 2004 also
specifically prohibits the sale of human biological material, and thus one may
equally imply a recognition of ownership in England as a result of that, the lack
of a common law right of destruction of one’s body in that jurisdiction, combined
with the comments of Lord Justice Rose in R v. Kelly, suggests that property
rights in corpses in England cannot come into being without explicit legislation.
In whom is the Ownership Right Vested?
It is trite to say that a thing cannot be stolen if it is owned by
no one.71 Therefore, as precedent authority suggests that corpses may be stolen
in Scotland, it there must be an owner. Exactly who that person is, however, is
difficult to determine.
A variety of persons may be considered as potential owners of the human
corpse,72 and there are a number of instances in which ownership may arise.73
In the case of deceased persons who have left no special directions as to the
fate of their corpse, two parties in particularmaymake claim on it – the executor
of the deceased’s estate and the State.
The executor of the deceased’s estate may claim ownership of the corpse for
several legal, and a number ofmoral, reasons. Leaving aside themoral argument
See MacDonald, Practical Treatise (note 34), 16.71
For example, the State, the Church, executors of the deceased’s estate, hospitals or museums.72
For example, donation of the body for purposes of display or medical research.73
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for the moment, the first of these reasons is the fact that it is certainly open to
argue in Scotland, although not in England as a result of R v. Bentham, that one
may hold property rights in one’s own whole74 living body. Such an argument
is grounded in classic and contemporary legal definitions of possession and
ownership, combinedwith the fact that themaxim dominusmembrorum suorum
nemo videtur is not affirmed in any Scots precedent and, as such, there is
nothing in Scots law precluding the application of these definitions to the human
body itself.
It is firmly settled in Scotland that possession arises if a person who holds
an object has detained the item with the intention of holding it as property.75
It is equally settled that the existence of a right of possession presumes property
in relation tomoveables,76which is not the case in England.77 The act necessary
to cause the occurrence of detention varies, depending on the nature of the
thing in question,78 but what is always necessary to bring this to effect is the
attainment of exclusive physical control.79
The fact that an individual has exclusive physical control over his or her own
body is obvious from the fact that all others are naturally debarred from attaining
any legal form of control over it. As has been stated, individuals have the com-
mon law right in Scotland to choose the time and nature of their own death
should they have the physical capability to bring about that end themselves.
From this one may conclude that the living person is, according to Scots law,
in corporeal possession of his or her own body.
There is a great deal of authority from the institutional writers to suggest
that if corporeal possession is lawful, intention to possess will be presumed.80
Notwithstanding this fact, both elements which display intention to possess
can easily be illustrated with respect to the human body, by the simple fact of
the individual choosing to live. The first of these is the intention to exercise
exclusive physical control over the thing detained,81 which may be illustrated
throughout the whole of the individual’s life by the fact that they have not chosen
to vacate the body by means of suicide. The second element indicative of inten-
tion is the intent to exercise control for the benefit of oneself. This intent is
Parts and derivatives of the body which are disconnected from it yet still ‘living’ may become
the subject of property in England as per Yearworth (note 6).
74
See Bell’s Principles of the Laws of Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1899), ch. 3, para. 1311.75
Ibid., para. 1313.76
Ibid.77
See Young v. North British Railway Co. (1887) 14 R (H.L.) 53.78
The Laws of Scotland: The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia,Vol. 18, Property (LexisNexis/Law Society
of Scotland, 1991) para. 119.
79
Ibid., para. 123; Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1981), 1, 17; Bankton An Institute (note 57), 1-26.
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evidently present in all living individuals, since it is impossible to sell oneself
lawfully into slavery in the United Kingdom.
In spite of the above, the argument that the executor of the deceased’s estate
is the owner of the corpse has a number of problems, primarily the fact that it
presupposes the existence of a next of kin. This challenge may be refuted as it
could be countered that, in such circumstances, ownership may nevertheless
be vested in the administrators of the estate, as the duties normally placed on
an executor fall to them in the absence of such a person.82 However, there is a
great deal of authority83 which states in strict terms that an executor holds no
right of property in the corpse of the deceased. Such authority, although cited
in C, is English and accordingly can be viewed as a direct result of the ‘no
property’ rule; therefore its continuing relevance to Scotland may be brought
into question. A stronger argument against the existence of proprietal rights
being vested in an executor is the fact that the executor is not legally bound to
follow any special direction as to the disposal of the corpse of the deceased.84
This suggests one of two things. Either the body of the deceased was not that
person’s own property in life and thus the executor is disbarred from claiming
any vested right in it on the grounds that if the corpse formed a part of the estate,
the executor would be bound to dispose of it as directed,85 or that the death of
the individual is to be regarded as an abandonment of the property, meaning
that a human corpse is rendered res nullius.86
As a consequence, the possibility of State ownership should be examined.
It is thought to be the case that the Crown ‘fills any hiatus in ownership’87
should property be abandoned by its owner, thus if the latter position is regarded
as the legal reality then the State may be regarded as appropriating ownership
on the death of the individual. In addition, the State may be able to further
substantiate its claim to ownership of the corpse by arguing that a dead body
is property which is extra commercium and is thus not subject to private owner-
ship.88 While it may be countered, as has been stated, that the existence of
section 20 of the 2006 Act suggests that the human corpse is not extra commer-
cium in Scotland, since that section would be redundant if a corpse truly was a
thing outside commerce, some regardmay nevertheless be paid to the comments
made by the learned sheriff in Robson. While there is no doubt, on the basis of
C v. Advocate General (note 1), para. 46.82
Listed in C v. Advocate General paras 44-47.83
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (note 79), para. 506.84
As he/she is with all property of the testator, unless such direction in the testament is success-
fully challenged in court.
85
Meaning ‘owned by no one’.86
Jones & Christie, Criminal Law (note 35), paras 10-13.87
See R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930),
ch. V, ‘Property’.
88
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the cited authority, that the sheriff erred in his statement that the law of Scotland
is as settled as the law of England with regard to the existence of property rights
in corpses, the fact that he regarded them as extra commercium cannot be so
readily overlooked. This part of the judgment remains consistent with the pos-
sible existence of proprietal rights in dead bodies and, accordingly, may continue
to hold contemporary relevance.
There are several European jurisdictions89which recognise the existence of
proprietal rights in relation to dead bodies. Notable among these nations is
Hungary,90where state ownership of corpses is acknowledged and consequently
autopsies may be carried out by the medical profession without informed con-
sent from the family of the deceased. This is viewed as morally justifiable on
the grounds of utilitarianism – medical advances may be made as a result of
examination of and experimentation on human corpses.91
However, while the State having lawful ownership of the human corpse
may be legally logical in Scotland, given the aforementioned argument, it may
not be regarded as a particularly moral situation in spite of the utilitarian
viewpoint. This difference in ethical thinking between the United Kingdom
and Hungary is exemplified by the controversy surrounding the revelation that
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had maintained possession of the biological
material of deceased soldiers without permission from their families.92 Such
an event would not be considered at all scandalous in Hungary, but the fact
that the event prompted an apology from the MoD,93 as well as feelings of ‘an-
ger’94 from the families of the persons in the United Kingdom, suggests an
entirely different kind of ethical thinking.
While it may be stated that the human body is no longer regarded as being
as sacrosanct as it perhaps was in earlier centuries, it cannot be doubted that
the family and friends of a deceased individual would hold that the human
corpse should be treated with some degree of reverence. Thus the Scottish po-
sition here seems clouded. On the one hand, the law would appear to suggest
that the possibility of State ownership of cadavers cannot be overlooked, on the
other the notion of personal ownership of one’s own body would appear to be
more favourable from an ethical standpoint. The European distaste for the idea
Such as Denmark, Hungary and Germany.89
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that the human body may be reduced to a mere commodity95 appears to be
shared by the Scottish judiciary and Parliament and accordingly, in spite of the
legal logic, the ‘no property in a corpse’ position may actually be favoured by
some.
In the modern age, however, this cannot be regarded as an acceptable posi-
tion. There are certainly some ethical thinkers who would regard the ability to
sell derivatives of one’s own body for profit as the end goal of recognition of
full proprietal rights in human biological material96 – a view to which strong
moral objections may be raised – but this is not at all a necessary implication
of such recognition of self-ownership. Rather, themost significant consequence
of the existence of ownership of one’s own body would be the greater level of
personal autonomy which would be conferred on individuals.
Cases such as Yearworth and Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd97 illustrate the
benefits to the individual which are realised by the existence of property rights
in living human material, even in the absence of any aspect of commercialisa-
tion. The possibility of individuals receiving compensation for negligence in
relation to derivatives of their bodies and the ability of individuals to exercise
some degree of control over such derivatives have greatly advanced personal
rights and extended individual autonomy. While this may not necessarily be
supported by someone taking a paternalistic view, it is quite clear that contem-
porary medical jurisprudence and bioethics favour the existence of personal
autonomy overall.
There are compelling arguments which support recognition of proprietal
rights in dead bodies and human biologicalmaterial. However, while theremay
be scope in the law of Scotland to bring about legal recognition, and while there
are certainly persons who provide convincing moral arguments as to why this
should happen, a consensus of ethical thinking does not change overnight.
Attitudes which find commercialisation of human material repugnant may
continue to oppose referring to the human body in terms of property, in spite
of the fact that section 20 of the 2006 Act essentially prevents their fears from
becoming reality.
It has long been recognised that the law cannot keep pace with the speed of
advances in medical technology. It would appear on examination that even in
cases where this is not true and the law is ahead of medical technology, or may
be interpreted in such amanner, the general moral thinking of individuals may
nevertheless lag behind.
Some ethical commentators, notably Uffe Jensen, state that it is not at all appropriate to discuss
the human body in terms of property; see U. Jensen, Property, Rights, and the Body: The Danish
Context – A Democratic Ethics or Recourse to Abstract Right? (Kluwer, 1998).
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Conclusion
In spite of the fact that prima facieScottish law appears to reject
the notion of proprietal rights existing in respect of human biological material,
the above analysis appears to show that this is not in fact the case in strict legal
terms.
Burnett suggested that anything may become the subject of theft if it can
be carried away from its proper owner, and strong case law suggests that this
principle includes corpses. The English tenets which preclude ownership rights
in that jurisdiction cannot be regarded as applicable to twenty-first century
Scotland, either as a result of divergences in legal thinking, the evolution of
spiritual thought, or the advancement of scientific technology.
The fact that the Human Tissue Act 2006 is silent on the matter of propri-
etal rights existing in relation to human biological material must be read as
permissive. Given the direct precedent authority which suggests that corpses
may be stolen, in the absence of any statutory intervention it should be concluded
that property rights must be recognised by the law of Scotland in this regard.
The argument that the human body should not be discussed in terms of
property as it should not be commoditised is easily refuted since the Scottish
Parliament explicitly ensured prohibition of commodification of the human
body by passing section 20 of the 2006 Act. Nevertheless, it may be suggested
that the human body is to be regarded as res extra commercium, with the State
holding a right of proprietal interest over dead bodies. This possibility of State
ownership is supported, albeit in an unorthodoxmanner, by the case of Robson,
although there is certainly scope to argue that onemay have ownership of one’s
own body and, as a result, the executor may have claim to proprietal rights.
However, while the legal position appears quite clear, moral thinking is
slower to adapt to change. Although society no longer views dead bodies with
the same degree of reverence that it once did, there is still nevertheless an ele-
ment of distaste towards the notion that the rights to the body parts of a deceased
person may be vested in anyone other than the family. While this particular
moral view does not entirely preclude the possibility of proprietal rights existing
in respect of corpses, it is nonetheless hostile to the notion, and advocates of
this position are more likely to support the English position.
In spite of this possible moral objection, the view of the Court of Appeal in
Yearworth that English law requires a reanalysis in order to respond adequately
to twenty-first century technology cannot be regarded as untrue. As has been
stated, technology has advanced, and quite probably will continue to advance,
at such a rate that legal and ethical thinking will require more or less constant
review. Given that the Scottish position appears to require no reanalysis in this
area, as Scottish law is already able to recognise the existence of proprietal rights
in human biological material, it may be concluded that Scotland finds itself in
a position where clearer, fairer andmore honest legal answers may be provided
in cases, such as Yearworth, that have proven problematic to English law.
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